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relations."5 7 It is interesting to speculate what brand of federalism
strips an admittedly valid state procedural rule of its efficacy and
finality and forces a busy state court to reconsider a case which under
its own procedure-a procedure concededly designed to serve a
legitimate state purpose-had been heard and fairly determined.
In Fay v. Noia, Mr. Justice Harlan predicted that "the effect of
the approach adopted by the Court is, indeed, to do away with the
adequate state ground rule entirely in every state case, involving
a federal question, in which detention follows from a judgment.""8
It would seem that the Court in Henry, with its reliance on the
collateral effect of Fay, substantiates the warning by Mr. Justice
Harlan, and that a concept-by many thought basic to a federal
system-has in the course of two years been substantially diluted if
not fatally undermined.
RONALD

W.

HOWELL

jurisdiction-Collateral Attack-Bootstrap Doctrine
In the recent case of McKee v. Hassebroek,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a federal district
court decision allowing the heirs of a joint owner of United States
savings bonds to attack collaterally an Oklahoma probate court's distribution of those bonds as a part of the estate of the other joint tenant. The joint tenants, husband and wife, had apparently agreed that
the bonds would be included in the husband's estate. The wife, who
was co-executrix of her husband's estate and devisee of a life estate
in his personal property, considered the bonds a part of his estate
and never asserted her own ownership, except as life tenant under
the will. After her death intestate, the wife's heirs-at-law gained
possession of the bonds, and the remaindermen under the husband's
will brought an action in the federal district court to recover them.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
"8Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965).
" Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 469-70 (1963).
" It should be noted in this respect that the Court in Henry adopts the
same "waiver" concept as that set out by the Court in Fay-a deliberate
by-passing of state procedural rules. The fact that the Court relies on Fay
in applying this concept would seem to lend strong support to the conclusion that only the most flagrant procedural defaults will prevent a person
detained pursuant to a state judgment from asserting his federal claims either
on direct appeal or in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding.
1337 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1964).
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finding that the state probate court had had no jurisdiction over the
savings bonds, since federal regulations, which provide that the
surviving joint tenant shall receive absolute title to such bonds upon
the death of his co-tenant, must prevail. Thus, the savings bonds
were never a part of the husband's estate and the wife's heirs were
found to be the proper claimants.
The court of appeals did not concern itself with the question
of whether a collateral attack should be allowed under these circumstances, assuming that "since the bonds were never a part of
the decedent-husband's estate, the probate court did not acquire
jurisdiction over them and the purported exercise of jurisdiction
was a nullity,"2 and collateral attack therefore proper. The court
thus adhered to the doctrine of coram non judice: if the court rendering a judgment had no jurisdiction, the judgment is void for
all purposes.' The doctrine of coram non judice as applied to jurisdiction of the subject matter has been modified, however, by the
United States Supreme Court's decisions that the doctrine of res
judicata applies to a court's express4 or implied 5 determination of
its own jurisdiction of the subject matter when the court has jurisdiction of the parties, so that such a determination will prevail over
collateral attack of its judgment for want of jurisdiction.
The doctrine of res judicata is grounded in the belief that
economy in legal processes and certainty and finality of court judgments are desirable and perhaps necessary elements of a workable
legal system.' Generally res judicata is thought of as applying to
decisions on the merits of an action rather than to decisions on
jurisdiction. But it is obvious that someone must decide whether
or not a court has jurisdiction of a particular case, and that decision
necessarily rests initially with the court in which the action is
brought.' The Supreme Court has indicated that as long as there
-Id.
at 312.
E.g., Int re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), where the Court quoted
Elliot v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828): "But if it [a court]
act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.
They are not voidable, but simply void." 124 U.S. at 220. See 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 322 (5th ed. 1925).
'Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940).
aSee 2 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 626; Developments in the LawRes Judicata,65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1948).
'Where adversary parties appear, a court must have the power to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction of the person of a litigant, or
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is no blatant lack of jurisdiction,8 it is more desirable to give this
decision finality beyond appeal than to allow collateral attacks which
would frequently result in mere second-guessing. If the rendering
court has jurisdiction of the parties so that all have notice and there
is no question of lack of due process, it is not unreasonable to require a timely appeal by any party who wishes challenge the court's
jurisdiction of the subject matter. "After a party has had his day
in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of
the law," the Court has said, "a collateral attack upon the decision
as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously
determined. There is no reason to expect that the second decision
will be more satisfactory than the first." 9
There is no doubt that the state probate court in McKee was
wrong in its distribution of the savings bonds, for the Supreme
Court, in Free v. Bland,'° held that the federal regulations controlling distribution of jointly owned savings bonds must prevail
over local laws under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
A wrong decision, however, is not necessarily jurisdictional.11 And,
even if the probate court's error was jurisdictional, perhaps the
court should have considered whether the "bootstrap doctrine"' 2
should be applied.
It is arguable that the mistake of the Oklahoma probate court
in distributing the bonds was mere error which could be corrected
only on appeal,' 3 since otherwise the doctrine of res judicata would
apply to the decision on the merits. A probate court has juriswhether its geographical jurisdiction covers the place of the occurrence
under consideration. Every court in rendering a judgment tacitly, if
not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter.
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938).
'In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940), the Court stressed the apparent regularity of the proceeding of the
trial court whose judgment was being collaterally attacked. Cf. United
States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), where the Court, in sustaining a
contempt conviction being attacked on grounds that the rendering court
had no jurisdiction, stated: "a different result would follow were the question of jurisdiction frivolous and not substantial. .. " Id. at 293.
OStoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
19369 U.S. 663 (1962).
" Burnet v. Desmornes Y Alvares, 226 U.S. 145 (1912).
1 Application
of res judicata to jurisdictional decisions is commonly
called the "bootstrap doctrine." Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The
Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARv. L. REv. 652 (1940).

in

" See generally CHAFEE, Lack of Power and Mistaken Use of Power-,
296 (1950).

SOME PRO1LEMS OF EQUITY
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diction over the "estate" of a decedent, 4 and necessarily that court
must determine initially what the estate is.' 5 Can it be said that a
mistake as to the total content of the "estate" is jurisdictional?" 6
The Supreme Court considered a somewhat analogous situation in
Jackson v. Irving Trust Co."

In that case, the United States at-

tempted to attack collaterally a judgment rendered in a statutory
cause of action on grounds that the statute did not authorize recovery by "enemies" of the United States and that the successful
claimant was in fact an "enemy." The Court rejected the argument
that the rendering court's mistake was jurisdictional and held that
appeal was the only proper remedy. Also relevant to the question
of whether a particular mistake is erroneous or jurisdictional are
cases in which a court of equity has granted equitable relief when
there was, in fact, an adequate remedy at law. Some courts have
called such a mistake jurisdictional.' Chafee, in Some Problems
of Equity, has made a strong argument that such mistakes are not
jurisdictional at all, but mere error, since there is no justifiable
reason to single out a particular fact and "put it into a separate
category as 'jurisdictional'."' 9 To interpret jurisdiction of the
subject matter to mean jurisdiction of a particular object rather
than jurisdiction over a general area of the law could conceivably
open our courts to a virtual flood of relitigation, for the logical
conclusion of such an interpretation is that any wrong decision
is jurisdictional. Such a view would forsake the rule that "the test
of jurisdiction is not right decision, but the right to enter upon
14 See 3 PAGE, WILLS § 26.3 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961).
19
10

See it re Griffin's Estate, 199 Okla. 676, 189 P.2d 933 (1947).

Some courts have held that probate courts have jurisdiction to try

title contested under joint tenancy and community property laws. In Robison
v. Sidebotham, 243 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1957), the court refused to allow
a collateral attack by a wife on a probate's distribution of certain property
as part of her ex-husband's estate, even though she claimed that the property
was not and never had been part of the estate. The wife had submitted a
petition claiming the land in probate court, and the present court found that
she was therefore not a "stranger to the estate" and was bound by the
probate decision. The court mentioned the fact that in California, community property is not subjected to inheritance tax, which would seem to
indicate that the state does not consider it a part of an "estate." See In re
supra note 15.
Griffin's Estate,494
(1941).
11311 U.S.
"E.g., Denison v. Keck, 13 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1926).
1"

CHAFEE,

op. cit. supra note 13, at 329. See Woodrow v. Ewing, 263

P.2d 167 (Okla. 1953), where the court refused to allow a collateral attack
on a proceeding to quiet title on grounds that the person in whom title
was quieted was not in fact the owner. The court said this was error only.
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decision." 2

the inquiry and make some
It would seem that the
probate court in McKee must necessarily have made some inquiry
as to the status of the bonds and come to some decision about them,
and, in Chafee's view, "if a court is bound to come to some conclusion, it has jurisdiction."2 1
Jurisdiction of the probate court in McKee is further substantiated by the existence in the law of wills of the doctrine of election, 22
application of which is within probate jurisdiction.2" Under that
doctrine, when a testator devises property actually belonging to
another to a third party and also devises certain of his own property
to the former, the true owner of the property thus devised to the
third party must elect either to take his own property and renounce
the gift under the will, or renounce his own property and take the
gift.2 4 Thus, if T devises property to A and at the same time devises A's property to B, A must relinquish his own property to B
in order to take the property devised to him. Acceptance of benefits
under the will implies election to take under the will-no express
and formal mode of election is required.25 The McKee court refused
to apply estoppel on the basis of the wife's conduct because it found
she did not benefit from the inclusion of her bonds as part of the
estate. This conclusion would seem to be incorrect under the doctrine of election, for the wife in McKee was devised and received a
life estate in all her husband's personal property.
Hence, it is apparent that under the doctrine of election probate
courts do have jurisdiction to distribute property belonging to
persons other than the testator if such property owners elect to
accept the terms of the will. It would therefore follow that distribution of such property in violation of the federal regulations is more
properly considered erroneous than void.20
2

oUnited States v. Ness, 230 Fed. 950, 953 (8th Cir. 1916).
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 308.
See generally 5 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 47.1-.46.
•
See Int re Williams' Estate, 272 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1954).
2 E.g., Brossenne v. Schmitt, 91 Ky. 465, 16 S.W. 135 (1891); Brown
v. Brown, 42 Minn. 270, 44 N.W. 250 (1890); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio
App. 187, 45 N.E.2d 614 (1942); Fox v. Fox, 117 Okla. 46, 245 Pac. 641
(1926) (dictum). See 5 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 14, § 47.13. The defendants in McKee would, of course, be bound by their intestate's election
as privies.
.'E.g., Job Haines Home for Aged People v. Keene, 87 N.J. Eq. 509,
101 AtI. 512 (1917). See Matteson v. White, 98 Okla. 190, 224 Pac. 499
21

(1924).

2" For cases
holding that erroneous judgments are res judicata, see
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); Goldsmith v. M. Jackman & Sons,
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Assuming lack of jurisdiction of the probate court, however,
perhaps the federal court should have disallowed the collateral attack under the bootstrap doctrine. The doctrine has been applied by
the Supreme Court in situations where there was a collateral attack
on the judgment of a federal court in another federal court2 7 or in

a state court, 28 but it apparently has not been applied to a state
court's determination of its own jurisdiction when that court's judgment has been attacked in a federal court proceeding. The Court
has intimated that when there is no "countervailing" federal policy,
bootstrap should be applied.2 9 However, there is a strong indication
that the Court considers the application of the doctrine to a state
court judgment to depend upon whether the state itself would apply
it.8" This would appear to be the correct view under section 1738 of
the Judicial Code,"' which requires federal courts to give full faith
and credit to state court proceedings. Oklahoma seems to have

adopted the bootstrap doctrine.3 2
It can be argued that the bootstrap doctrine should not be applied in McKee in any event, since a probate court is an inferior
court. The general rule is that an inferior court judgment carries
no presumption of jurisdiction, so that it is subject to collateral
attack unless jurisdiction clearly appears on the face of the proceedings. 3 However, probate courts usually receive the benefit of a
Inc., 327 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1964); Providential Dev. Co. v. United States
Steel Co., 236 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1956).
"'Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940).
"Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
"Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
"°Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962).
3128 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958):
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof . . . shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
It can be argued that § 1738 does not require recognition of bootstrap
jurisdiction at all, especially since it was enacted substantially in 1790
(ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122), before the bootstrap doctrine was developed.
2 Consolidated Motor Freight Terminal v. Vineyard, 193 Okla. 388, 143
P.2d 610 (1943); Fitzsimmons v. Oklahoma City, 192 Okla. 248, 135 P.2d
340 (1942).
E.g., Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173 (1809)
(Chief Justice Marshall's dictum). See 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3,
§ 397. Although the court whose judgment was being attacked in the Chicot
County case was an inferior federal court, such courts are not considered
"inferior" courts for this purpose. In the case of McCormick v. Sullivant,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825), the Court said:
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presumption of jurisdiction for this purpose,- 4 and Oklahoma is
clearly in accord.' 5 Oklahoma's county courts have general probate
jurisdiction," and "their orders and judgments should be accorded
like force, effect, and legal presumption as the judgments and decrees of other courts of general jurisdiction. .

. .""

Further, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court has held"8 that probate jurisdiction includes the power to decide whether title to land had vested in a
wife at the death of her husband, under a state joint-ownership
statute, or was the joint property of both husband and wife, the
court considering this an "incidental question ...within the probate
jurisdiction of the county court." 9 The bootstrap doctrine then
would seem to be applicable in McKee if the federal court gives the
state court judgment the effect it would receive in the state itself.
The Supreme Court has created an exception to the bootstrap
doctrine: when "the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata
is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act
beyond its jurisdiction,"4 collateral attack is allowed. The Court
has applied the exception on two occasions, in the cases of Kalb v.

42
41
and United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
Feuerstein

In Kalb, the Court decided that the Frazier-Lemke Act had preempted jurisdiction of a state court to dispossess the petitioners
during pendency in a federal bankruptcy court of an action brought
under the act. The Court found congressional intent to make such a
pre-emption expressed in the act itself, which act provided that
They [inferior federal courts] are all of limited jurisdiction; but they
are not, on that account, inferior courts, in the technical sense of
those words, whose judgments, taken alone, are to be disregarded. If
the jurisdiction be not alleged in the proceedings, their judgments and
decrees are erroneous, and may, upon a writ of error or appeal, be
reversed for that cause. But they are not absolute nullities.
Id. at 199.
,See 3 PAGE, Op. cit. supra note 14, § 26.142.
"Tiger v. Drumright, 95 Okla. 174, 217 Pac. 453 (1923).
"OKLA. CONsT.

art. VII, § 13.

Tiger v. Drumright, 95 Okla. 174, 176, 217 Pac. 453, 455 (1923).
"In re Griffin's Estate, 199 Okla. 676, 189 P.2d 933 (1947).
"Id. at 680, 189 P.2d at 937. A Nebraska court allowed a probate court
established under a constitutional provision (NE . CoNsr. art. V, § 16)
very similar to that of Oklahoma (OXLA. CONsT. art. VII, §§ 12-13) to
hear a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership of certain
United States savings bonds as between decedent and her daughter, who
were named as co-owners on the bonds. It re Hendricksen's Estate, 156
Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
"RESTATEMENT,
'308 U.S. 433 (1940).
"309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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"proceedings for foreclosure of a mortgage on land . . . or for

recovery of possession of land" shall not be maintained or instituted
in other courts except with permission of the bankruptcy judge.43
Further, the act stated that "all such property shall be under the
sole jurisdiction and control of the court in bankruptcy. .

. .""

In

United States Fid. & Guar. Co., the Court held that the policy of
governmental immunity outweighed the policy of res judicata when
the government had not consented to the suit being attacked. Lower
federal courts have made a few additions to the list of "countervailing policies."4
How strong is the policy of governmental control over distribution of joint-tenancy savings bonds? Unlike the statute involved
in Kalb, the distribution regulation involved in McKee was not legislated by Congress, but was a regulation of the Secretary of the
Treasury 40 made under Congress's general authorization. 47 This
would seem to indicate that Congress considered it less important
than the Frazier-Lemke Act, in which it expressly manifested its intent to create exclusive federal jurisdiction, and certainly it has
less universal effect. The Frazier-Lemke Act was designed as a
major force in combating the effects of economic depression, whereas
the savings-bond regulation primarily effects only co-tenants of
bonds and has no significant importance beyond the parties themselves. The policy of such a regulation would not seem to be strong
enough to defeat application of the doctrine of res judicata, which
has implications far beyond the parties to any particular litigation.
Neither would the regulation seem comparable in importance to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which has always been a basic tenet
of our legal system. One state court has interpreted the policy of
the regulation as merely "providing protection to the government if
" 47 Stat. 1473 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 203(o)(2) (1958).
" 49 Stat. 943 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 203(p) (1958).
" In Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 977 (1964), the court allowed a collateral attack in federal court
on a decision of the Court of Military Appeals because the latter court
afforded no appeal. "We believe that an example of such an overriding consideration is present here, since a party should be given his day in a court
from which review by the Supreme Court might ultimately be afforded."
Id. at 985. Accord, It re Maier Brewing Co., 38 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal.
1941) (corporate reorganization under the Chandler Act). Cf. Denver Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"a31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959).
4?40 Stat. 291 (1917), 31 U.S.C. 757(c) (1958).
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co-owner." 4

its agents pay the named owner or
In a situation
where an estate of one co-owner successfully challenged the right of
the other co-owner to take the bonds under the survivorship regulation, the court said: "It seems clear that the federal laws and regulations are not intended to interfere with the positive act of two coowners of bonds by which one conveys her interest in them to the
other."4 9
DORIs R. BRAY
Taxation-Deductibility of Campaign Expenses

Two recent decisions of United States district courts have questioned the soundness of the general rule that campaign expenses
incurred by a candidate for public office are not deductible in the
computation of federal income tax.' In Maness v. United States,2
"Ii re Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 476, 56 N.W.2d 711, 719
(1953).
19

d. at 477, 56 N.W.2d at 719.

'This rule is stated in 4 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.135 (rev. ed. 1960) and in 1 RABxIN & JOHN oN, FEDERAL

INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 3.03(10) (1964). The Treasury
accepts the rule. See Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(a)-15 (1940), as amended,
T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 96, 98; Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(o)-1 (1940);
Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.23(a)-15(b), 29.23(o)-i, 29.23(q)-i (1943); Treas.
Reg. 118, 8§ 39.23(a)-15(f), 39.23(o)-1(f), 39.23(q)-1(a) (1953); Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
79; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.16220(b) (1) (i), 29 Fed. Reg. 11190 (1964). See also Statement of Assistant
Commissioner Sugarman Before the Special Committee of the House of
Representatives to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952), reprinted in 5 CCH 1953 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6029. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the accompanying legislative history
have supported the rule. Section 271 disallows the deduction of bad
debts owed by a political party to a taxpayer; a taxpayer may generally
deduct bad debts under section 166. Section 162(e) clarifies deductibility of lobbying expenses dealt with in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c)(1)
(1958), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 79. By partially
changing the rules stated in the regulation it allows some types of
lobbying expenses to be deducted. However, the rule stated in the regulation
that campaign expenses are not deductible was not changed. Section
162(e) (2) (A) provides that the deduction allowed for certain types of
lobbying expenses shall not be construed as allowing the deduction of any
amount incurred in political campaigns. For case law supporting the rule
see McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944); Mays v. Bowers, 201
F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953); Harry D. Moreland, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1036
(1960); George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936); David A. Reed, 13
B.T.A. 513 (1928), revid on other grounds, 34 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1929),
rev'd, 281 U.S. 699 (1930).
2 15 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 217 (M.D. Fla. 1965).

